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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the eect of a pension system on the life expectancy and the
lifetime utility level using an optimal dynamic problem of individuals who live in continuous
and nite time. Our model yields a number of intriguing results: 1) Life expectancy is not
always proportional to lifetime utility. 2) The pension system can make life expectancy longer
or shorter. 3) It is not always true that the pension system improves the lifetime utility level.
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1 Introduction
According to an anecdote in Europe, as soon as a pension system was introduced, the number of
people who jog in the park for their health increased. Believe it or not. Anyway, under pension
system, it looks like a good deal, if we live long enough. This paper analyzes the eect of a pension
system on the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level. Bloom et al. (2007) and Dushi et
al. (2010), etc. examine the eect of improvements in health or life expectancy on social security
system, however, we focus on the eect on the opposite direction.1
A vest amount of emprical and theoretical researches about the pension system has been
accumulated. Many previous researches analyze economic welfare using overlapping generation
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1Weil (2007), Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), Zhang and Zhang (2004), Zhang et al. (2001), etc. analyze the
eect of improvements in health or life expectancy on economic growth.
1models. The main results of some previous studies on pension system and economic welfare can be
summarized as follows: under a fully funded system, the economic welfare is not aected, however,
under a pay-as-you-go pension system, depending on the economic situations and generations, the
economic welfare might be both improved and worsened. The public pension system as a risk-
hedging device can increase welfare by providing a certainty in the imperfect market. (Shiller,
1999, Krueger and Kubler, 2002, Sanchez-Marcos and Sanchez-Martin, 2006, Bohn, 2009, etc.)
Meanwhile, the public pension system crowds out the private savings. It can have a negative
eect on capital accumulation and can retard growth. (Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Feldstein and
Liebman, 2002, Zhang and Zhang, 2004, etc.) The overall welfare impact depends on the balance
between the insurance eect and the crowding-out eect.
We use the optimal dynamic problem of individuals who live in continuous time, not discrete
time like the overlapping generation models used in the presvious studies. (e.g. Sanchez-Marcos
and Sanchez-Martin, 2006) This is one of the dierence of our model from the previous models. In
lifetime uncertainty models, e.g. Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), Chakraborty (2004), Momota,
et al (2005), etc., we assume that it is possible to extend life span by the eort of an individual
through health investments.2 For examples, eating good food, taking some nutritional supple-
ments, getting in shape by going to the gym, investing in development of medical technology, etc.
Longevity will arise due to the given examples on health investments. An individual distributes
his budget to his basic needs and to his health investments to maximize his lifetime utility. We
consider that individual's longevity is based from the result of individual's utility maximization
problem. We investigate how the optimized life span and the lifetime utility level can be changed
by a pension system.
Our model yields two impotant results: i) Life expectancy is not always proportional to lifetime
utility level. ii) Pension system can make the life span longer or shorter. The life span depends on
the type of pension system. From the combination of the results i) and ii), it is possible that 1)
pension system makes the life span longer and increases the utility level. 2) pension system makes
the life span longer, however decreases the utility level. 3) pension system makes the life span
shorter and decreases the utility level. Case 1 is preferable. but Case 2 and 3 are not preferable
cases, but could possibly happen.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and drives the benchmark
2Lifetime uncertainty models assume that the health investments can increase the surviving probability. However,
we do not consider uncertainty in our model.
2outcomes. In section 3, we introduce the pension system to the benchmark. Section 4 solves the
models numerically and analyzes the results and concludes. And nally, we include an Appendix.
2 The benchmark Model
2.1 Setting
We consider an individual's utility maximization problem under the nite period. He can live up
to T years old and dies at the age of T . An individual maximizes his lifetime utility which is
aected by consumption. The instantaneous utility function is specied in log form as follows:
u(c) = ln c (1)
where c is a consumption. We think that it is possible to extend the life span by the eorts of
the individual. We assume that there is a linear relationship between health investment and life
span as follows
T = a+ bz; (a > 0; b > 0) (2)
where T and z are life span and health investment, respectively. And a and b are positive
constants. We assume that the health investments do not aect the utility directly.3 We also
assume that the interest earning is the only source of income of the individual. And to simplify,
a small country is assumed, then the interest rate is constant at all period. Let us denote the
individual's asset as x, then his budget constraint is written as:
_x = rx  c  z (3)
where r is an interest rate.
An individual's utility maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
c(t);T
Z T
0
e t ln c(t) dt; (0 <  < 1)
s:t _x(t) = rx(t)  c(t)  z
(4)
3We can divide the consumption c into two categories. These are the general consumption cG and the consump-
tion for health improvement cH . The eect of the latter cH on the utility of individual is unclear whether positive
or negative. For examples, there might be a person who drinks wheat grass for his health maintenance even though
it is unpalatable, while there might be a person who drinks it with the thinking that it is delicious. There might be
a person who commutes to the gym for his health maintenance though it is painful, while there might be a person
who goes happily to the gym. Nutritional suppliments are benicial for health but are not delicious. Therefore, we
assume that the consumption for health improvement cH is neutral to an individual's utility. This means @u(c
H )
@cH
=0.
u(cH) = u(cG; cH).
3where  is a discount rate. We assume r  .4 For simplication, we assume that z has a constant
value from initial period until T period and that z is decided at the initial period. In unrealistic
assumption, we assume that as an individual is born, he decides how much he invests for his
health and how long he lives under a social environment.
2.2 Solving the Model
The maximization problem is solved in two stages. At the rst stage, we do not consider the Eq.
(2). Maximize over c and x for any given T and z, and then the objective function maximized
with respect to c and x could be described as a function of T and z. At the second stage, we
consider the Eq. (2). Maximize over T and z taking into account c obtained in the rst stage.
2.2.1 The First Stage
We use the Hamiltonian method to solve the maximization problem. The Hamiltonian is written
as follows:
H = ln c+ (rx  c  z) (5)
By dierentiating Eq. (5) with respect to c and x, we can get Eq. (6) and Eq. (7).
@H
@c
=
1
c
   = 0 ) c =  1; (6)
@H
@x
=   _ = r )
_

=   r: (7)
We integrate Eq. (7) to time t, then we get
ln = (  r)t+ k (8)
where k is a constant of integration. Taking exponential both sides of Eq. (8), then we can get
 = C1e
( r)t (9)
where C1 = e
k. Substituting Eqs. (6) and (9) into Eq. (3), we obtain the following
_x  rx+ z =  C 11 e tert: (10)
4If r = , there is no transitional path, because the jump from the initial state upto the terminal state occurs.
If r < , there is an overshooting, the economy turns back to the terminal state and has a negative growth rate.
We do not consider the negative growth in our analysis.
4This dierential equation is solved as folllow
x =
1
C1
e t   1


ert + C2e
rt +
z
r
(11)
where C2 is a constant. See Appendix for the detailed calculation. C1 and C2 can be obtained
from substituting the initial condition and transversality condition. Let us x(0) = x0, then we
get C2 as follows
C2 = x0   z
r
: (12)
To maximize his utility, when dying, he uses up all his asset and leave nothing. In other words,
x(T ) = 0. We get C1 as follows
C1 =
1

1  e T
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
: (13)
Substituting Eqs. (12) and (13) into Eq. (11), we obtain the following
x(t) =
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T (e
 t   1)ert + (x0   z
r
)ert +
z
r
: (14)
Substituting Eq. (9) into Eq. (6), we can get
c(t) = 
x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t: (15)
Eqs. (14) and (15) are the optmal paths of x and c, repectively by regarding the variable T and
z as xed.
2.2.2 The Second Stage
In the second stage, to maximize his lifetime utility, the individual chooses his optimal T with
considering Eq. (2). We can rewrite the utility maximization problem as follows:
max
T
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt
s:t T = a+ bz
(16)
We solve the integral in Eq. (16), then we can induce Eq. (17)Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt
=  ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T
e T   1


  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2
 (17)
See Appendix for the detailed calculation. Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (17), Eq. (16) can be
rewritten as Eq. (18) which has no integral and has only one control variable T . Eq. (18) is just
a static maximization problem, not a dynamic one.
max
T
ln


x0   (1  e rT )T arb
1  e T
1  e T


+ (r   )
1  (T + 1)e T
2

(18)
5We take the derivative of Eq. (18) with respect to T and set the rst derivative to zero.
e T ln


x0   (1  e rT )T abr
1  e T

  1  e
 T
b
e rT (T   a) + (1  e rT )1r
x0   (1  e rT )T abr
  e T +(r )Te T = 0
(19)
Eq. (19) is an implicit function as f(x0; T ja; b; r; ) = 0 which is highly non linear and dicult to
solve analytically.
3 Pension System
We introduce a pension system into the benchmark model. He pays a pension p from 0 to s period,
gets a pension q after s period. Government decides p, q and s which are constants as given to
individuals. This pension system plays as a compulsory saving for individuals. For simplication,
we do not consider the balanced budget of the government for the pension system. It can be a
fully funded system or a pay-as-you-go pension system, because we do not need to consider where
the nancial resources of pension come from, under the situation where there is no need for the
balanced budget.
We shall call the period from 0 to s period as young period and after s period as old period.
His budget constraint Eq. (3) is changed to Eq. (20).
_x =
8<:rx  c  z   p; if 0  t  srx  c  z + q; if s < t  T: (20)
The way to solve the model with this pension system is similar to that of the benchmark model
even though we have to divide it into young period and old period. Eq. (11) is changed as follow
x =
8<:
1
CY1

e t 1


ert + CY2 e
rt + z+pr ; if 0  t  s
1
CO1

e t 1


ert + CO2 e
rt + z qr ; if s < t  T:
(21)
where, CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 are constants of integration which are as follows:
CY1 =
1

1  e s
x0   (1  e rs) z+pr   x(s)e rs
(22)
CY2 = x0  
z + p
r
(23)
CO1 =
1

(e T   e s)ers
z q
r (1  er(s T ))  x(s)
(24)
6CO2 =
z q
r (1  er(s T ))  x(s)
(e T   e s)ers (1  e
 T )  z   q
r
e rT (25)
where, x(s) is interpreted as both the terminal value of young period and the initial value of old
period at the same time. By the same way as the previous, Eq. (15) is changed as follows
c(t) =
8<:
1
CY1
e(r )t; if 0  t  s
1
CO1
e(r )t; if s < t  T:
(26)
Substituting Eq. (26) into the utility function, we obtain the followingZ s
0
e t ln
 1
CY1
e(r )t

dt+
Z T
s
e t ln
 1
CO1
e(r )t

dt (27)
We integrate Eq. (27) to time t, then we get
ln
 1
CY1
1  e s

+ ln
 1
CO1
e s   e T

  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2

: (28)
There are z's in CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 . We substitute z =
T a
b into C
Y
1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 , then,
the original dynamic optimization problem with the pension system is nothing less than the static
optimization problem with respect to T and x(s) as seen in Eq. (29). In other words, all he has
to do is just to decide his own life expectancy and the initial asset at the old period.
max
T;x(s)
U
 
T; x(s)

= ln
 1
CY1
 
T; x(s)
1  e s

+ ln
 1
CO1
 
T; x(s)
e s   e T

  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2
 (29)
4 Results and Conclusion
Taking the derivative of Eq. (29) with respect to T and x(s), and setting each rst derivatives to
zero, and solving the system of equations, we could obtain the optimal T  and x(s). Since the
prot function of Eq. (29) is highly nonlinear, however, it is very dicult to get an exact analytical
solution for this problem. The alternative option is to provide the solutions numerically. The
suitable parameter values are used for the calculation, though they are arbitrary. The parameter
values that we used to calculate are the following: a = 20, b = 10, x0 = 100,  = 0:01, r = 0:02.
To show the eect of p, q and s on life expectancy and lifetime utility, p and q are controlled from
0.0 to 2.0, and s is controlled from 0.0 to 20.
Each panel in Figure 1 shows the results as the coutour lines. Figure 1(1) and 1(2) show the
results of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when s is xed at 10.0
7Figure 1: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level
while p and q are changed. In Figure 1(1) and 1(2), the values on the left-upper side are high and
the values on the right-lower side are low. Under xed s, when p is small and q is big, the life
expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher. Figure 1(3) and 1(4) show the results
of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when q is xed at 1.0 while p and
s are changed. In Figure 1(3) and 1(4), the values on the left-lower side are high and the values
on the right-upper side are low. Under xed q, when p is small and s is short, the life expectancy
is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher. Figure 1(5) and 1(6) show the results of the life
expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respectively, when p is xed at 1.0 while q and s are
changed. In Figure 1(5) and 1(6), the values on the right-lower side are high and the values on
the left-upper side are low. Under xed p, when q is big and s is short, the life expectancy is
8longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
To summarize these results, when p is small, when q is big, and when s is short, that is, when
an individual pays a small amount of money for a short period of time and gets a big amount
of money from his pension, the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
These results accord with intuition.
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
27
.5
30
.0
32
.5
35
.0
37
.5
40
.0
42
.5
Life expectancy
Li
fe
tim
e 
ut
ili
ty
 le
ve
l I
II
III
IV
A
Figure 2: Comparison of the results with and without the pension system
Figure 2 plots the relationship between the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level. The
horizontal line and the vertical line present the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level,
respectively.5 The +'s in Figure 2 are the corresponding values of the life expectancy in Figure
1(1), 1(3) and 1(5), and the lifetime utility level in Figure 1(2), 1(4) and 1(6). And point A
(24.556, 33.742) shows the pair of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level obtained from
the benchmark model. All of these +'s except point A show the pairs when the pension system
exists in some way or another. We draw a vertical and horizontal line from point A and divide the
plain into 4 areas. In area I, the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher
compared to point A. In area II, the life expectancy is longer but the lifetime utility level is lower
compared to point A. In area III, the life expectancy is shorter and the lifetime utility level is
5The gures of the life expectancy tell nothing about the relative length of life expectancy. As the concept of
the ordinal utility, the dierences in the gures of the life expectancy are treated as meaningless. The gures do
not mean the number of years.
9lower compared to point A. There is no pair in area IV.
The life expectancy is not always proportional to the lifetime utility level. Comparing with a
'+' in area II and point A, even though the life expectancy is longer, the lifetime utility level is
lower. And the pension system can make life expectancy longer or shorter and can make lifetime
utility level higher or lower. If we get big amount of pension in the future, the life expectancy
can be extended and the lifetime utility can go up. It is the most preferable, however, in today's
reality, the pension system cannot avoid the problem of nancial resources.
The pension system could also lead to some kind of inrmity as follows: 1) Even though the
life expectancy is extended, the lifetime utility level goes down. By that, an individual is forced to
pay the pension during his young period, the pension system leads to less personal consumption
in his young period. Even though he tries to prolong his life for a long time to get his money back
which he paid mandatorily, his lifetime utility level can go down compared to a case of no pension
system. 2) The life expectancy is decreased, moreover, the lifetime utility level goes down. This
is the worst scenario. An individual can choose a short life to refuse to pay the pension until such
period s and to increase his consumption in his young period.6
It is not always true that the pension system improves the lifetime utility level as shown in
area II and III in Figure 2. Not only the government has to exert eort to avoid inrmities as
stated above, but the government also has to reconsider about the raison d'etre (the reason for
existance) of the compulsory pension system.
Appendix
Derivation of Eq. (11)
Let us put B =  C 11 . Multipling both sides of Eq. (10) by e rt and integrating to time t, we
get the following
( _x  rx+ z)e rt = Be t
xe rt   z
r
e rt +D1 =  Be
 t

+D2
(A1)
6There was an accident reported in South Korea last 2005, where in a person who was against the compulsory
pension system and was in arrears with his pension took away his life.
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where D1 and D2 are constants of integration. Eq. (A1) can be arranged as follows
xe rt   z
r
e rt =  Be
 t

+B
1

+ C2
x  z
r

e rt =  B
e t   1


+ C2
(A2)
where C2 = D2 D1 B 1 . Multipling both sides of Eq. (A2) by e rt and substitutig B =  C 11
into Eq. (A2), Eq. (A2) can be arranged as Eq. (11).
Derivation of Eq. (17)
Let us put A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

.
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1  e rT ) zr
1  e T e
(r )t

dt =
Z T
0

Ae t + (r   )te t dt
=A
Z T
0
e t dt+ (r   )
Z T
0
te t dt =A
h
 e
 t

iT
0
  (r   )
h(t+ 1)e t
2
iT
0
= A
e T   1


  (r   )
(T + 1)e T   1
2

(A3)
Substitutig A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

into Eq. (A3), Eq. (A3) can be arranged as Eq. (17).
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